Speech by Anderson, Susan
Speech
ANDERSON, Susan <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7081-3160>
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/24941/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
ANDERSON, Susan (2019). Speech. In: ANDERSON, Susan and HAYDON, Liam, 
(eds.) A Cultural History of Disability in the Renaissance. Cultural Histories Series . 
Bloomsbury. (In Press) 
Copyright and re-use policy
See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk
1 
 
 
Chapter 6 “Speech” 
 
In his 1607 exploration of humoural psychology, Thomas Walkington rejects the idea that 
external appearances give reliable information about a person’s inner character. Instead, he claims, 
“our usual saying is, that the tongue is the hereauld of the minde” (D2r).1 To really understand a 
person, Walkington suggests, you must listen to them speak. This is perhaps unsurprising coming 
from a clergyman who spent a good deal of his life preaching. Walkington embodied the importance 
of orality in the period, and the centrality of the spoken word to religious, political and social life.
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Walkington’s aphoristic language (“our usual saying”) implies that the link between tongue and mind 
is common knowledge. This chapter probes the implications of this assumption and its corollaries: 
that different ways of speaking were seen to reveal different kinds of person, and that these 
categorisations were hierarchised. Speech is both a socially-inflected phenomenon and a technique of 
physical embodiment (see St Pierre 2012, 11). Its acquisition and expression are thus intimately 
linked to the interplay between the unique embodiment of an individual and their specific cultural 
context. This chapter therefore uses the social model of disability to explore the exclusionary effects 
of Renaissance ideas about who should speak and how. 
Codes around speech, then as now, reflected wider ideologies of gender, race, and class, 
intersecting with each other and with individuals’ unique embodiment. These factors also interacted 
with larger historical forces in the period that affected the way in which speech and language were 
constructed and understood. Most notably, these included the spread of technologies of printing, 
which sped up the means by which ideas could be communicated; the development of scientific 
experimentation which offered challenges to received ideas and which began to supplant humoural 
models of the human body and mind; and the large increase in global trade, resulting in contact 
between language groups and forms that had been previously much more isolated from each other.  
                                                     
1
 In early modern quotations, spelling is original, though i/j and u/v have been regularised.  
2
 He even published a sermon on the topic of effective speech in 1608, titled in full Salomons sweete 
harpe consisting of five words, like so many golden strings, toucht with the cunning hand of his true skill, 
commanding all other humane speech: wherein both cleargie and laitie may learne how to speake. 
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To be educated in Renaissance Europe meant to be able to read and speak Latin and Greek. 
Educated speakers in the Renaissance also had access to a large body of advice about effective speech 
in the form of rhetorical handbooks. Their words were being heard in the context of widespread 
awareness of the techniques of effective - or perhaps even manipulative - public speaking, both in 
formal legal situations, and also popular sermonising. Thus, alongside a confidence in the capacity of 
speech to give access to truth was a concomitant suspicion that speech could be used to deceive. Such 
contradictory positions were characteristic of the ways in which speech and speaking differently were 
understood in the Renaissance. 
To help us understand what might have constituted non-normative speech patterns in the 
period, this chapter begins by outlining a range of theological contexts which shaped Renaissance 
assumptions about speech and language, most notably by creating an ideology in which language 
variation was seen as a problem, and in which certain forms of language were privileged over others. 
The chapter then moves on to considering the ways that speech was related to body and mind in 
contemporary medical discourse by looking at definitions of speech ‘defects’ in the later part of the 
period, as well as discussing some ways in which humoural theory might have accounted for 
variations in speech. This is followed by a section focused on the implications of rhetorical discourse 
for understanding non-normative speech. Rhetorical theory about effective and ideal forms of speech 
reveals some of the underlying assumptions about speaking that provided a basis for the legal 
disqualification and disenfranchisement of certain groups of people. In this way, the chapter shows 
how those who were unable to speak in particular ways were effectively excluded from personhood in 
the period. The last part of the chapter considers dramatic representations of non-normative speech, 
focusing mainly on early modern English drama, after a short consideration of Italian stage 
representations. The emergence of drama as a newly-professionalised genre in the Renaissance is in 
itself a telling piece of evidence of the continued importance of orality and oral forms in the period. 
Performed drama is constituted through both body and word, meaning that the drama of the period 
furnishes us with evidence for the importance and effect of speaking well or ill in the cultural 
imagination of the Renaissance.  
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This contextual material does not present a coherent or unified picture of how speech was 
understood in the period, because such a thing would be an oversimplification. Instead it provides a 
confluence of conflicting ideas that shaped expectations about normative kinds of speech, about who 
was permitted to speak and how, and what speaking itself meant, creating a context in which those 
who spoke in different ways would be heard - or ignored. The chapter will show that, despite the 
increasing importance of the written word, speech - and speaking rightly - were highly valorised in the 
period. As Carla Mazzio has pointed out, in the so-called “age of eloquence”, the inability to speak 
well, or to perform one’s speech correctly, was a disabling position (Mazzio, 2009). The ability to 
express onesself in spoken language was so central to the age of humanism’s conceptualisation of 
being human, that to lack speech was to lack personhood.  
Theorising speech difference: theological positions 
The etiology of speech difference in the Renaissance is too varied to be succinctly 
summarisable, but one thing is clear: that speaking differently is described as a ‘defect’ or 
‘imperfection’, and sources which discuss speech utilise this language of falling away from a norm. In 
some ways, this was a microcosm of the widespread notion in Christian Europe that the world is a 
fallen and imperfect place more generally, deriving from a theology in which all human beings are 
defective because of original sin. Thus a notion of generalised insufficiency provides an important 
backdrop for discussions of all forms of human frailty in the period. For example, when George 
Gascoigne (1576) complained that “none serve God, but only tongtide men” (C3v), he was 
participating in a tradition of complaint that takes as understood a fallen world of inevitably 
inadequate human effort. Nevertheless, the implication of this statement is also that serving God 
adequately would mean not being tongue-tied, making speaking an integral part of the ideal godly life.  
Having said that, it must be remembered that devotional vows of silence as a spiritual practice 
formed an important element of many if not all major monastic rules in the period, including the 
Benedictine and Domenican orders. Such complete prohibition of speech is perhaps extreme, but 
forms the logical extension of an association of verbosity with worldly turpitude. Samuel Gardiner, 
for example, who published a commentary on the story of the prodigal son, was deeply suspicious of 
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language and rhetoric. He asserts that “The holie spirit of God taketh a great grace, in shrowding and 
cowching matters of maine moment under the fewest words that may be. It is the fashion of the world 
in their fabulous discourses to use tedeous circumstances” (S4r). This statement is somewhat ironic, 
given the length and detail of Gardiner’s extensive examination of every aspect of the parable he is 
discussing.  
Gardiner also makes clear that the manner of speech is an important tool for judging the 
speaker, not just what is said. Through attending to the way a person speaks, Gardiner suggests, a 
listener can estimate the identity, cultural background, and moral state of the speaker. Gardiner cites 
scriptural authorities to argue that  
The mind of this man is known by his words, his mouth bewraieth what maner of man he is. 
As the Ephramites were knowne to bee Ephramites by their kinde of speech, being not able to 
pronounce Shibboleth: as the Damsell that kept the doore knewe Peter by his voyce, that hee 
was a man of Galilee: so commonlie mens workes are knowne by their wordes to be good or 
evill. [...] as golde that hath not a good sound may be thought to be counterfeit: so the man 
that hath not a good sound cannot be perfect. He that is of the earth speaketh earthlie: and the 
mouth of a foole (sayeth the wisdome of Salomon) blurteth out foolishnesse. As a man by his 
blistered and exulcerate lippes is knowne to have an Ague: so by our swelling and corrupt 
wordes we are knowne to have an inward and spirituall Ague (B8r-v). 
Gardiner’s extraordinary sequence of similes pathologises language, making speech into an 
expression of physical disease and moral degeneracy. Foolish speech is indicative of a foolish mind. 
Gardiner’s examples also show that speech is connected to geographical or ethnic identity. In 
particular, his invocation of the story of the slaughter of the Ephramites from Judges 12 frames speech 
difference in a context of potentially fatal consequences. The King James Bible of 1611 renders the 
story thus: 
And the Gileadites took the passages of Jordan before the Ephraimites: and it was so, that 
when those Ephraimites which were escaped said, Let me go over; that the men of Gilead said 
unto him, Art thou an Ephraimite? If he said, Nay; 
Then said they unto him, Say now Shibboleth: and he said Sibboleth: for he could not frame 
to pronounce it right. Then they took him, and slew him at the passages of Jordan: and there 
fell at that time of the Ephraimites forty and two thousand (Judges 12, 5-6). 
Gardiner is not interested in the rights and wrongs of this massacre, merely that the story provides an 
example of the close link between the aural quality of a person’s voice and the ability of a listener to 
accurately judge their identity.  
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Another foundational myth for Renaissance conceptualisations of speech and language is that 
of the Tower of Babel, which presents the entire existence of language variation as a symptom of 
fallen humanity’s failure to live according to God’s wishes. For example, Godfrey Goodman (1616) 
suggests that the “confusion of tongues first began at Babell, and is now generally spread over the 
face of the whole world” (292). Goodman makes clear that he considers language diversity (tellingly 
termed “confusion”) to be a punishment, preventing humanity from learning easily from one another. 
Furthermore, he claims that language is still under an ongoing process of degenerating, and laments 
that languages like Hebrew, Greeke, Latin, Syriac, and Chaldaic, are no longer widely spoken (in his 
experience). Instead, Goodman finds that the tongue is 
confounded with many base and barbarous languages, some of them very harsh in 
pronunciation, that a man must wrong his owne visage, and disfigure himselfe to speake 
them: others without gravitie or wisdome in their first imposition, consisting only of many 
bare, and simple tearmes, not reduced to any certaine fountaines, or heads, which best 
resembleth nature: Many of them hindring mans thoughts, and wanting a sufficient plentie of 
words, cannot significantly expresse the quicknes of invention or livelily expresse an action 
(293) 
Although Goodman laments all language variation as being part of God’s punishment, there 
emerges a clear hierarchy here. Some languages, Goodman suggests, require the speaker to contort 
their face, and this alone is enough to condemn them as “base” and “barbarous”. Other languages do 
not appear to Goodman to have the capacity to express complex or precise concepts. Patricia Palmer 
(2001) traces the ways that judgements about language were characteristic of European colonial 
exploration and conquest, both in Spanish encounters in the so-called New World, and in English 
relations with Ireland. Palmer argues that “the link forged between reason and eloquence implied a 
consequent equation between defective tongues and defective thinking” (30). Certain kinds of speech, 
therefore, rendered certain peoples less than human, supposedly justifying their conquest and 
subjugation. As Palmer notes, for example, Edward Topsell’s 1607 The Historie of Foure-Footed 
Beastes, a catalogue of animals, included an entry categorising pygmy people as apes because 
“though they speak [,] yet is their language imperfect” (cited in Palmer 2001, 220). 
While global trade and expansionism meant that linguistic chauvinism had international 
consequences, commentators like Goodman also acknowledged that language varied on a more local 
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scale, noting that “in the same tongue you shal observe a great diversitie of dialects” (294). Models of 
linguistic difference explained this by literally mapping them onto regions. For example, Paul Cohen 
(2003) notes how Guillaume Bouchet’s 1598 description of linguistic diversity in France attributes 
differences in pronunciation, tone, and facility to climate and geography: 
the more the people are in the south, the more they speak from within the stomach, and with 
heart, and with a voice full of consonants, without vowels, bruskly [sic] pronounced, and with 
many aspirations: because of the force and nature of the spirits, which are very present there, 
and from the impetuosity of the intense heat. But those who inhabit the southern hemisphere 
... and the Midi, who have their body heat tempered, and their minds weakened, pronounce 
softly ... Language even takes on certain characteristics of water, which alters voices and 
languages, so that those who live near rivers, are more likely to stutter (Cohen’s translation, 
9) 
The idea that local conditions produced permanent bodily changes matches contemporary climate 
theories of race, which linked variation in the physiology of human populations, for example in skin 
tone, to the region in which they lived, that is, hotter or cooler areas of the globe (see Floyd-Wilson, 
1998). Such differences in local conditions, Bouchet suggests, also changed the physical capacity for 
language of the people who lived in different areas.  
Speaking bodies 
The consistently metonymic use of “tongue” in Goodman and in other English sources to 
mean both a language and the way in which it was spoken reflects a conceptual conflation of speech 
and body that demonstrates the way that speech is indeed a combination of social context and physical 
capacity. The tongue’s role in speaking was examined more literally by Helkiah Crooke in his 
Mikrokosmographia. First printed in 1615, this monumental work offered a new way of looking at 
many aspects of medicine and disease through an encyclopedic tour of the human body. Crooke 
includes a discussion of the anatomy of the tongue and offers an explanation for a range of speech 
difficulties. Crooke suggests that the tongue 
is faulty sometimes in magnitude, sometimes in the very substance together with his muscles. 
For if it be bigge it filleth up the spaces of the mouth and the Chops, and then it cannot moove 
so deliverly or nimbly as otherwise it would, and such men are called blaesi and 
balbutientes,that is Lispers and Stutters, especially if (as it happeneth most what) it bee also 
too soft or moyst. (626) 
The Latin terminology cited by Crooke was still in common use. As Marc Shell points out, the 
etymological link between balbutientes and barbarians reveals that  
7 
 
 
both also refer to “those people who, although they do speak our language, do not speak it ‘in 
our way.’ ” It does not matter much whether these people speak English with a foreign 
“accent,” domestic “dialect,” or more general speech “impediment.” (73) 
Crooke suggests that speech impediments can also result from “the muscles being little” with the 
result that the tongue “is mooved too swiftly and so implicateth or doubleth the speach and maketh the 
words come hudling together” (626). He also describes what is now commonly referred to as tongue-
tie: 
The Tongue also sometimes is too short when the Bridle thereof is not enough cut, so then it 
is hindered that it cannot apply it selfe on every side to the Mouth (626) 
Crooke also draws emphatic attention to what he sees as the connection between ears, palate, nose and 
throat. For example, somewhat alarmingly, he suggests that “if you goade the Tympane of the eare 
with a Pen-knife it will presently cause a drie Cough” (701). Crooke goes on to claim that  
Those which be halfe deafe do speak but stutteringly and their voyce is made through their 
Nose. Againe, those who from their Birth are deafe, are in like manner άλαλος, that is, are 
dumbe. 
Crooke’s hugely successful handbook influenced anatomy and surgical practice, but it also 
shows the increasing physicalisation of medical discourse. No longer relying on references to 
venerable sources, Crooke provided anatomical drawings giving an unflinching portrayal of usually 
unseen parts of the body.  
[Figure 6.1] 
 
This movement towards a kinds of empiricism must be held alongside the scholastic, 
humoural-based understanding of the voice in the period, though. Indeed, Crooke himself offers 
humoural explanations when he refers to the levels of moistness of the tongue above. A link with 
humoral moistness is also put forward by Crooke as the explanation for stuttering’s presence in 
childhood. 
Hence it is that Infants and those children that are moyster then ordinary doe speake slower 
then others, because of the softnesse and loosenes of their Tongues and the muscles thereof, 
till when their heate by their age encreasing the over aboundant moysture be consumed (626) 
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Such humoural reasoning seeks to explain bodily symptoms through reference to balance or 
imbalance in the four bodily humours alongside qualities of dryness, moistness, heat and cold. 
Although accounts of humoural medicine rarely agree on the causes and cures of the ailments they 
describe, this ancient system for understanding the human body and mind persisted in popularity 
through the Renaissance period. 
The basic principles of humoural theory were often invoked as common knowledge in 
descriptions of speech. For example, William Painter’s story of “A Ladie Falslie Accused” in Tome 1 
of The Palace of Pleasure offers two examples of tongue-tied speakers, whose difficulty in getting 
their words out come from opposing emotional states. The first is the wicked steward, whose plot to 
implicate the virtuous lady of the house is the core of the tale. As his lies take hold, he finds himself 
temporarily unable to speak: 
the Traitour, whose sense was so confounded with gladnesse, that thinkyng to beginne his 
tale, his wordes so stucke in his mouthe, as he was not able to utter a worde (fol. 120) 
This villain’s joy at his success creates a block that temporarily prevents him from speaking. 
Eventually, he manages to convey his story to the master of the house, a jealous man who is only too 
ready to believe the lies he is told about his wife:  
The lorde hearyng these pitifull newes, which perced his harte more depe, then any two edged 
sworde, at the first was so astoned, that he could not tell what to saie or doe, savyng the 
ardente furie of Cholere, made hym distill a certaine Melancholique humor into his eyes, 
whiche received the superfluous vapours of his braine. At length breaking that forthe, whiche 
troubled hym within, and grindyng his teethe for furie, with stuttering and uncertain voice, 
fetching sighes betwene, saied. "O GOD what newes bee these that I heare? (fol. 120-1) 
In both cases, halting speech is indicative of emotional turmoil. In the latter case, the overflowing 
brain vapours emerge as tears, spilling out of the lord’s eyes uncontrollably. By contrast, his voice is 
inhibited and a lack of control is denoted by juddering, stuttering speech.   
The mixture of choler and melancholy as underlying the lord’s response matches the mixed 
sense of the underlying humoural causes that contemporary sources posit as the cause of inhibited 
speech. Turning to Robert Burton ([1621] 1989), we find a typically inclusive and encyclopaedic 
collection of ways in which bodily motions and actions might be linked to emotional states: 
Weeping, Sighing, Laughing, Itching, Trembling, Sweating, Blushing, hearing and seeing 
strange noyses, visions, winde, cruditie, are motions of the body, depending upon those 
precedent motions of the mind (1.422.12-14) 
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A person’s predominant temperament (“precedent motions”) can thus be read through a range of 
expressive symptoms. Burton goes on to report that a melancholy disposition is indicated by 
stuttering, that is “stutting, or tripping in speech” (1.382.23-4). In extreme cases, further vocalisations 
are listed amongst the symptoms, which include “laughing, grinning, fleering, murmuring, talking to 
themselves, with strange mouthes and faces, inarticulate voices, exclamations, &c.” (1.382.25-7). 
The link between these symptoms and melancholy, Burton reports, is dryness (contra Boorde, 
below): “they that stutter, and are bald will be soonest melancholy (as Avicenna supposeth) by reason 
of the drynesse of their braines” (1.202.15-7). Francis Bacon agrees that stuttering is caused by 
dryness, but links this to a choleric disposition, saying “many Stutters (we finde) are very Cholerick 
Men, Choler enducing a dryness in the Tongue.” (Century 4.386). To be fair, Bacon also notes that 
this is rare, ascribing most cases of stuttering to coldness of the tongue which he suggests can be 
relieved by a moderate intake of wine.   
The relationship between alcohol consumption and speech fluency may have a physiological 
component that can be observed transhistorically. Drinking a small amount of alcohol has been shown 
in recent studies to improve pronunciation and fluency in second language speaking (Renner et al, 
2017) and to decrease anxiety and enhance self-perception of performance in public speaking 
(Stevens et al, 2017). The emphasis here is on small, however, and the difficulty of getting the correct 
dosage is apparent in Robert Heath’s “On Stut” (1650): 
The more Stut strives to speak, he stams the more;  
But his cold tongue wel oyld, and hot with store  
Of wine, he speaks not like an Oracle then,  
But much, and loud, and plain as other men:  
Such Eloquence hath pow‘rful wine: but he  
Drinks oft til he can neither speak nor see.  
The Remedie here is worse then the disaese, [sic] 
Better then none, a tongue imperfect is (F4r) 
The vignette depicted here outlines schadenfreude at the sense of frustration experienced by the 
thwarted speaker, and a mocking tone which matches the comedic stage stutterers discussed below. 
Above all, however, Heath confirms that to not speak is worst of all, and that an “imperfect tongue” is 
better than none. The poem collapses difference into abjection, the overdose of wine meaning that 
‘Stut’ can now no longer see, nor speak at all, leaving him in sightless silence. 
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One extremely common explanation for stuttering was in fact imitating a stutterer. The 
scientist Robert Boyle (1627-91), for example, credited his own stutter to  
his acquaintance with some children of his own age, whose stuttering habitude he so long 
counterfeited, that at last he contracted it; possibly a just judgment upon his derision, and 
turning the effects of God's anger into the subject matter of his sport (Boyle 1744, 6) 
Boyle’s account of the origin of his stuttering is placed alongside the death of his mother as one of the 
two “great disasters” of his childhood, suggesting that his stammer was a source of comparable 
anguish to him. Although he notes that he was subjected to many attempts to cure him, he does not 
detail what these were, only to say that they were “tried with as much successlessness as diligence”. 
Nevertheless, his stammer is not mentioned in the subsequent reminiscences of his schooldays at 
Eton, and although his musical studies were curtailed because of his “bad voice”, he reports that he 
was able to acquire native fluency in both French and Italian during his travels in Europe, minimising 
the impression that stuttering might have had any impact on his later life. 
In addition to the notion that stuttering is contagious, Andrew Boorde (1587) adds two further 
causes: 
one doth come by nature. The other doth come by humiditie of the senewes of the tongue, and 
the third commeth to be in the companie of a stutter or stamerer (21) 
To address the issue of contagion, Boorde suggests avoiding those who stutter (a ‘remedy’ which may 
have encouraged those with speech impediments to keep quiet rather than risk ostracisation). For the 
humidity of the tongue, Boorde recommends a concoction of basil, cowslips and wine, or of figs, 
honey and “Castorie”. For those whose stutter is congenital, however, “it can not be holpen, except it 
be reformed in youth by some discrete tutor”.  
Stuttering speech could thus indicate a more generalised and permanent condition, whether 
there was a consistent humoural explanation for that or not, but equally, it is clear that Renaissance 
commentators recognised stammering as a localised reaction to particularly emotive circumstances, 
whether joyful or rage-inducing (as in the example from Painter above). For example, Burton notes 
Scaliger’s point that “the voice of such as are afraid, trembles, because their heart is shaken” 
(I.422.15-16), connecting the trembling of fear with both inner and vocal trembling. The possibility 
that speech can reveal the emotional state of the speaker thus makes rhetorical training a useful skill, 
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not only in terms of cultivating a level of control over one’s speech, but also in terms of exploiting the 
signifying power of vocal qualities to create intended effects.  
Defining speech: rhetorical and legal positions 
Thomas Wilson’s The Arte of Rhetorique (1553) is one of many textbooks of the period that 
outline ideal kinds of speech against which readers might measure themselves and aim to remedy their 
own ‘defects’ by adopting the writer’s advice. The prevalence of such textbooks in the period 
demonstrates the importance of rhetoric per se, but also a more general importance attached to speech 
and to speaking ‘well’. Wilson describes hemming and hawing as a fault in speech that makes the 
speaker look stupid, and links it to a broader lack of structure in rhetorical speech. Being an effective 
orator is possible, he says, 
if we orderly observe circumstaunces, & tell one thyng after another from tyme to tyme, not 
tumblyng one tale in an others necke tellyng halfe a tale, and so leavyng it rawe, hackyng & 
hemmyng as though our wittes and our senses were a woll gatheryng. Neither shoulde we 
suffer our tongue to runne before our witte, but with much warenesse sette forthe our matter, 
and speake our mynde evermore with judgement (fol. 59). 
Wilson prizes structure and fluency. An effective speaker, he suggests, plans the order in 
which to say things, takes their time, and refrains from interjections. To ‘hack’ and ‘hem’ is to 
interject non-semantic sound into one’s speech, a habit that is usually represented today with words 
such as “ah” and “um”. Whether intentional or not, this common technique has the effect of giving an 
improvising speaker time to think without giving the audience the impression that the speech is over. 
For Wilson, however, such verbal noise makes a speaker appear witless, making clear the link 
between levels of intellect and kinds of speech that is implied by the idea that the “mind” is revealed 
through the tongue. Such supposedly inadequate forms of speech are also scorned by Franciscus 
Junius who in 1638 observed “they are deservedly laughed at, who going about to tell a tale doe 
nothing but stutte and stammer, belching out some abrupt & pittifully chopt speeches” (315). 
The legal consequences of speaking in ways which are unexpected or do not conform to the 
ideals articulated by writers like Wilson and Junius could be severe. Leonard Cox (1524) claims that 
disordered speech can be a sign of guilt, for example. Cox notes that an orator can justifiably argue 
that a suspect willingly did the crime of which they are accused “yf after the dede was done he fled or 
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els whan it was layed to his charge: he blusshed or waxed pale or stutted & coulde nat well speke”. 
(E6r). Cox thus states that the manner of speech in a legal case is valid grounds for believing or 
disbelieving a defendant’s claims. Those who stutter in the dock already seem guilty to Cox, whether 
that stutter is related to their temporary emotional state or a more permanent condition. 
Legalistic definitions further demonstrate the ways that language difference was a focus for 
exclusion in the period. Henry Swinburne’s A Treatise of Spousals points to the etymology of the 
word “infant” in order to explain how those underage do not have the right to enter into contracts on 
their own behalf (in this case, he is interested in marital contracts). Although published posthumously 
in 1686, Swinburne’s views reflect his sixteenth-century training at Oxford in the 1570s and his 
subsequent legal career in York before his death in 1624. Swinburne suggests that “infants” denotes 
those Younglings and Babes which as yet cannot speak, for so this Substantive (Infans) an 
Infant, doth import, being compounded of in and fando, of not speaking, the Praeposition (in) 
standing for (non) (p.18, also cited in van Sant 2002, 48) 
Swinburne then goes on to show how the word denoting the life stage of infancy is transferred to 
denote a particular legal status: 
Our Temporal Lawyers no less significantly than usually, do call them Infants which have not 
attained yet to the Age of One and twenty years, because until that time they are as it 
were Tongue-tied, being unable to speak, at least effectually; and though they 
speak naturally, yet do not the Laws understand, or acknowledge their words to be of any 
force, either for Alienations or other Contracts, more than if they were young Infants, 
naturally destitute both of Speech and Judgment (19) 
The lack of recognition in law of a person’s ability to express their wishes and interests effectively 
silences those who are defined as underage, not to mention, as Ann van Sant points out, women, Jews, 
male and female religious and any others who do not fit the normative concept of “free and lawful 
men” (Pollock and Maitland, cited in van Sant 2002, 48). Swinburne’s assumptions here bring 
together the ability to speak and a mental capacity to make judgements. That capacity is, in a circular 
fashion, conferred by conformity to the social and cultural categorisations outlined in law.  
John Rastell is another early modern lawyer who outlines a range of criteria for judging 
mental capacity. In his glossary of legal terms, he includes the following description:  
Ideot is he that is a foole naturally from hys birth, and knoweth not howe to accompt or 
number twenty pence nor cannot name hys father, or mother, nor of what age hymselfe is, or 
such like easie and common matters: soe that it appereth he hath noe maner of understandinge 
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of reason nor governement of him selfe what is for his profit, or disprofit &c. (Rastall 1579, 
S4v-S5r; see also Metzler 2016, 149) 
Rastell’s prescriptions make clear that the manner in which this capacity is to be judged is through 
speech. A person must be able to “name” their parents, and this involves speaking aloud. Counting to 
twenty is also, presumably, a test that requires that the individual speak the numbers aloud. These 
“easie and common matters” are thus only accessible through speech. To be fair, Rastall also suggests 
that what he calls “the light of reason” (and thus avoidance of the categorisation of “ideot”) can also 
be assumed to be present in a person who 
can reade, or lerne to reade by instruction and informatyon of others, or can measure an elle 
of cloth, or name the daies in the weeke, or begette a childe 
Rastall’s prescriptions suggest that individuals are required to demonstrate proof of their worth to 
society, and that insufficiency in speech places an individual in a liminal category where their worth is 
to be doubted.   
This possibility of doubt in the inherent worth of individuals who fail to conform to normative 
expectations around speech comes through in the autobiography of Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury 
(c.1582-1648). Although he writes with the confidence of an extraordinarily privileged aristrocrat, 
Herbert nevertheless seems oddly insistent on his linguistic abilities and medical knowledge. In the 
early parts of the text, Herbert is at pains to emphasise his facility in language-learning, boasting of 
having taught himself Spanish, French and Italian (in addition to his knowledge of Greek and Latin). 
He also outlines at length various medical remedies that he recommends and an anecdote in which his 
intervention cured a family servant who had been given up for dead by doctors. These assertions are 
telling juxtaposed with his account of speech delay in early childhood. 
He describes his infancy as “very sickly”, and outlines an inability to speak which he blames 
on frequent discharges from his ears that he ascribes to epilepsy. There also seems to have been a 
psychological component here, as he describes having feared saying something “imperfect or 
impertinent”, preferring not to speak at all rather than risk this outcome. When he did speak, he 
reports asking some precociously philosophical questions which made his nurse and other carers 
laugh at him. It was because of this, Herbert claims, that his younger self refrained from speaking, 
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even though he could understand what was said. This had the result that “many thought I should bee 
ever dumbe” (11) and that, because of the “defluction” from his ears, nobody thought “fitt to teach 
mee soe much as my Alphabet” (13). Herbert’s childhood symptoms placed him in the liminal 
category outlined by Rastell, not given the opportunity to learn to read until these symptoms ceased, 
which Herbert reports was at the age of 7. Far from seeing his case as evidence that his early 
symptoms were not cause to abandon his education, Herbert instead suggests that it shows that 
hereditary diseases, amongst which he includes epilepsy, must be cured in infancy or not at all. Thus, 
Herbert is able to distance himself from the outcast ‘infans’ in both senses: he is no longer a child, and 
he is no longer unable to speak. He is now able to assume his hereditary role as heir to his patrimony, 
becoming a courtier, diplomat, philosopher and writer.  
Herbert’s experiences demonstrate that even those in the most privileged tranches of society 
were at risk of exclusion from legal personhood if they were unable to speak. His autobiography 
defensively positions himself as diametrically opposed to this alternative identity that haunted his 
childhood. Hesitancy in speech, repeating syllables, or unorthodox pronunciation were considered 
habits that should be left in childhood, as specifically mandated by St Paul: “When I was a child, I 
spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away 
childish things” (KJV, 1 Corinthians 13, 11). Herbert prefers to leave his stammering in his childhood 
and, like Boyle above, once his account reaches his adulthood, he portrays his linguistic abilities as 
exceptional.
3
 An expert in medical matters and a confident speaker in several languages, Herbert’s 
self-portrayal seems defined against the spectre of his former child self, at risk of rejection and 
neglect. 
In contrast to Herbert, Niccolo Tartaglia (c.1506-1557), the renowned Venetian 
mathematician, seems to have had a lifelong speech impediment, signified by his name, Tartaglia, 
meaning stutterer. According to Smith, he was reputed to have been injured as a child by a sabre cut 
to the mouth during the invasion of Brescia in 1512 (Smith 1958, 297). Nevertheless, he was able to 
participate in learned discourse, reputedly feuding with fellow mathematician Cordano and 
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 For a discussion of the relationship between multilingualism and stuttering, see Shell.  
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contributing significantly to the mathematical advances of the day by showing how to solve the cubic 
equation. Even for someone of Tartaglia’s remarkable mathematical talents, however, difficulty with 
speech was what gave him his nickname, further confirming the close links between kinds of speech 
and identity. 
Performing speech: words and drama 
“Tartaglia” was a nickname denoting stuttering, or some sort of impeded speech. When read 
in conjunction with European drama history, this does not seem to have been a particularly flattering 
gesture. The name was also in use for one of the stock characters of the commedia dell’arte, the 
traditional Italian improvised theatre. Tartaglia was usually a minor figure, brought on for a set piece 
scene. His characteristic stutter was, as Rudlin (2002) points out, an opportunity to generate comedy 
emphasising rude syllables or the proliferation of synonyms in order to avoid particularly difficult 
sounds (155). The opportunities presented by this kind of character were extended musically in Italian 
opera. It is in the very nature of music and song to extend and exploit the sonic properties of language. 
Syllables are stretched and repeated, and the rhythm of spoken words and sentences is disrupted. In Il 
ritorno d’Ulisse (1639) Monteverdi included a singing stuttering character. The opera retold the myth 
of Odysseus’s return to Ithaca. Monteverdi’s version of the story included a character called Iro, based 
on a figure mentioned only once by Homer. In the opera, Iro’s role is expanded, but only as a form of 
comic relief. As Rosand (1989) points out, he is entirely superfluous to the plot (147). Having been 
living off handouts from Odysseus’s rivals, Iro’s livelihood is threatened by the return of the hero. 
Once his patrons have been killed off by Odysseus, death is apparently Iro’s only option. Iro’s final 
aria leading up to his suicide is a bravura vocal display, starting with a howl of anguish and 
disintegrating into repeated syllables. As Rosand (1995) puts it, Iro “begs for consolation” and 
receives none, as his language dissolves into meaningless noise (albeit rendered musically). The irony 
here is that a role which depicts a lack of competence in speaking requires exceptional skill from the 
speaking (or singing) performer.  
In terms of understanding speech in the period, however, it is clear that speaking (or singing) 
strangely on stage was a source of mockery and entertainment, indicating foolishness and thus a 
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demand for ridicule. For example, the character of Amoretta in Ford’s The Lady's Trial (1639), speaks 
with a lisp, represented by the frequent use of “th” in much of her dialogue in the text. For example, 
upon hearing music, she exclaims: 
“Dentlemen then ye ith thith muthicke yourth, or can ye tell what great manths fidleth, made 
it tith vedee petty noyth, but who thold thend it” [Gentlemen then ye. Is this music yours, or 
can ye tell what great man’s fiddles made it? Tis very pretty noise, but who should send it?] 
(H1r) 
Although English spelling was by no means regularised in the period, it is clear that the 
orthography here represents unusual pronunciation. We see a range of potential moments of 
difference from standard speech. In addition to the “th” sound, there is the “d” sound at the start of 
‘gentlemen’ and in the middle of ‘very’, and the rendering of “pretty” as “petty”. One of her suitors, 
Futelli, highlights her idiosyncratic way of speaking as a means to flirt with her, saying that, rather 
than asking futile questions about the music, her “lips are destind to a better use, | Or else the proverbe 
failes of lisping maids”. As Hopkins (2011) explains in her edition of the play, lisping girls were 
proverbially supposed to be good at kissing (122), and Futelli is playfully suggesting that instead of 
talking, Amoretta should use her lips for that. This moment brings together a confluence of 
misogynistic ideas around speech, combining infantilisation of Amoretta as a childishly lisping maid 
with sexualisation of her through presenting her mouth as a sexual organ. Furthermore, it also draws 
on a broader misogynist trope of silencing the garrulous woman, whose mouth is axiomatically 
talkative and better used for responding to male sexual overtures. Female characters on stage in the 
period regularly repeat and condone these kinds of stereotypes, even when they do not embody them. 
The Duchess of Malfi, for example, goes calmly to her death, relinquishing speech and what she 
describes as the “woman’s fault” of talkativeness ( The Duchess of Malfi, 4.2.218. Anderson 2017, 
110). Amoretta seems unfazed by Futelli’s banter, telling him to “come behind with your mockth 
[mocks]”.  
Of course, these women, imagined by men and played by boys on stage, do not offer us a 
view of how women actually might have spoken, but these representations do offer us a glimpse of 
the gendered context in which voices were heard. A grieving Lear describes Cordelia’s voice as “ever 
soft, | Gentle and low, an excellent thing in woman” (The Tragedy of King Lear, 5.3.246-7), despite 
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having disowned her at the beginning of the play for not speaking as fulsomely as his ego had 
required. At the end of the play, death prevents her from speaking at all. Even when not presented as 
explicitly having speech impediments, women on stage consistently speak too much and too little, and 
speech in and of itself was an unavoidably gendered act. 
Boy actors occupied a liminal state between male and female kinds of speech (children were 
routinely grammatically gendered neutral with the pronoun “it” in the period). Gina Bloom (1998) 
speculates about the impact of puberty on boys’ performances as female characters, and suggests that 
the instability of a breaking voice might be a feature of boy actors’ performances rather than 
necessarily a problem. Certainly, boy actors were a mainstay not just of commercial theatre, but of 
civic pageantry and private performances also, making boys’ voices a ubiquitous feature of the sound 
of dramatic performance in the period. Their ability to inhabit and ventriloquise voices of different 
genders made them a frequent vehicle for testing ideas of speech. 
In The Lady’s Trial, Amoretta’s mistaken attitude towards marriage is not explicitly linked to 
her idiosyncratic speech patterns, but does correspond with the foolishness of her attitudes and helps 
to establish the necessity of her “reformation” (C3r). The scheme to gull her is meant to cure her of 
her unreasonable expectations of marriage, and bring her to accept that she must marry someone of 
comparable social standing to her own (as opposed to the rank to which she aspires). Amoretta’s 
lisping is not cured along with her unrealistic views,
4
 but her unorthodox pronunciation is clearly 
meant to complement a sense of her as foolish and laughable. The way she expresses herself is meant 
to be as ridiculous as the things that she says.  
In The Birth of Merlin, a magically-induced inability to speak altogether is represented by the 
Clown’s repeated “hum”. This spelling indicates that the previously-loquacious character is reduced 
to close-mouthed noise, and his dialogue on either side of his forced muteness suggests we are to 
imagine that he is trying to say ‘let me speak’ whilst his mouth is forced closed. In this case, the use 
of hum to represent textually a noise denoting a frustrated desire to speak is clear. The Clown is an 
example of the way that inhibited speech seems to be often associated with characters who in other 
                                                     
4
 and thus does not constitute an example of the kind of "narrative prosthesis" theorised by Mitchell 
and Snyder in their book of the same name 
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ways are actually extremely - even excessively - eloquent. This showcases a performer’s skill in 
replicating complex and varied speech patterns, as well as perhaps offering potential delight for the 
audence in unexpectedly seeing an actor who usually plays this kind of role shutting up temporarily.  
Captain Tucca of Poetaster, for example, is a very verbose character whose aggressive 
language is part of his ‘skeldering’ - that is, hustling and swindling. David Bevington suggests in the 
Cambridge edition that his odd speech patterns are modelled on a historical person, which seems 
likely given the play’s participation in the War of the Theatres. It is when in character as Mars that 
Tucca is described as stuttering with anger (4.5.69), though there is no textual representation of this 
kind of speech in the play. Nevertheless, the reference to him stutting brings in the kind of irony 
alluded to above, where a character’s usually active flow of speech has been interrupted by anger or 
strong emotion.  
This is most obvious in Marston’s What You Will, a play in which the apparently permanent 
stutter of Captain Albano is a significant driver of the plot and source of comedic action. Albano, 
supposedly lost at sea, comes home to find his wife about to remarry and everyone he knows 
mistaking him for someone else. These distressing circumstances do eventually give rise to his 
signature stutter, but not before he has delivered three fairly long speeches in 3.2. It is of course 
possible that, in performance, an actor could improvise extra stuttering, but it seems unlikely given 
the length of the scene. Furthermore, the effect seems rather to be one of extended verbal disquisition 
on the unpleasantness of what Albano is facing, building up in a kind of crescendo to a climactic 
spluttering. Albano may be a stutterer, but he is also very talkative. 
When plotting to prevent Albano’s supposed widow from remarrying, the conspirators, 
unaware that Albano is indeed alive, select Francisco the perfumer to impersonate him, as he is: 
ADRIAN: Exceedingly the strangest nearly like  
In voice, in gesture, face, in -  
RANDOLPHO: Nay he hath Albano’s imperfection too,  
And stuts when he is vehemently moved (381-4) 
Albano’s ‘imperfection’, his stutter, is something that is a permanent aspect of his character and yet 
one which only manifests at moments of excitement. It is at one and the same time an idiosyncrasy 
that marks him out as unique, as clearly as his clothes and other mannerisms do, and yet also 
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something which enables him to be replicated when he is being impersonated by Francisco. 
Francisco’s stutter matches Albano’s as effortlessly as his face does. As soon as Francisco is wearing 
the appropriate clothing, the transformation is complete.  
When encouraged to “grow in heat and stut” (971) by Jacomo in practice for the trick, 
Francisco obliges, and his speech excoriates Celia’s new suitor as “An odd phantasma, a beggar, sir, a 
who-who-who-what you will, a straggling go-go-go-gunds, f-f-f-f-fut -” (972-3). Part of the comedy 
here surely lies in the potential for suggesting blasphemous or otherwise taboo speech without 
actually articulating it fully. The repetition of the play’s title is also a potentially pleasurable release 
for the audience, standing in for an unsaid profanity and drawing attention to its own 
metatheatricality.  
In the subsequent scene, Albano repeats Francisco’s outburst, again in imagining Celia’s 
suitor. This time, it is in relation to Albano’s son who is about to acquire a step-father or  
father-in-law, his father-in-devil, or d-d-d-d-devil  
f-f-f-father, or who-who-who-who-what you will - 
The repetition here of the titular phrase What You Will reinforces the similarity between 
Albano and Francisco’s speech. It resounds elsewhere in the play, too, occurring six times in the main 
action and four times in the Induction. As a phrase, it gestures to an unspecified, unsaid thing, and 
thus draws the play as a whole into a process of avoidance, and of not being able to say what is surely 
about to be said but never comes.
5
  
Albano’s experiences leave him in confusion to the extent that he begins to doubt his own 
identity. As his state of mind deteriorates his speech continues to be represented as fragmented and 
enraged. The final straw comes when he meets his brothers who mistake him for his own imposter. 
Albano comes to believe that the rumours of his death must be true, concluding “I was drown’d | And 
now my soule is skipt into a perfumer”. It is language that renders this transformation complete. 
When a servant addresses him as Albano, he rejects the name on the grounds that if his own brothers 
think that he is Franciso the perfumer, then he must be. A name is lacking substance and is not 
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 Marc Shell (2012) describes the tactics used to avoid certain syllables in his account of his own 
experience of stuttering. 
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something he “could tast or touch | Or see, or feele” but is only “voice, and ayre”. Instead he 
concludes he must be Francisco, and as a tradesman, he adopts the catchphrase of a street seller: 
“What do you lack? what ist you lack right that's my cry.” Language in the form of his name has no 
power to render identity, but as a performed act, language turns him into the embodiment of 
Francisco, peddling his perfumes. If speech is the means to know a person’s mind, then Albano’s 
radical alienation from himself is also accomplished through speaking with a voice that is at once his 
own and someone else’s. Albano’s misery is untangled by the end of the comedy, and he is restored to 
his true identity and reunited with his wife. But the play’s exploration of the role of language in 
creating and confirming identity implies that it requires constant renewal and restatement. To be 
himself, Albano needs to speak (and be heard by others) as himself.  
Conclusion 
The power of speech to constitute identity is made most clear in the theatre. Theatrical drama 
presented a forum through which voices and identities could be ventriloquised, challenged, 
dismantled and reinforced. Albano’s identity is created within a framework of explicit theatricality 
precisely so that it can be destroyed and then restored. The theatre is thus a space in which fictional 
speech can be employed to explore the implications of speaking selves speaking as other selves for 
understanding questions of agency, identity, and moral responsibility. In drama, idiosyncrasies of 
speech become distinguishing features that differentiate character on stage, but which also come to 
signify character traits, evidence of inner qualities and of individuality. The consolidation and 
expansion of professionalised drama in the period thus enabled the repeated demonstration and 
exploration of the complexities of the relationship between speech and identity.  
Drama therefore, by its very nature, stages and makes explicit what the rest of this chapter has 
shown: that in the Renaissance, performed utterance was legally, historically, and socially the basis of 
articulating one’s personhood. The alternative and underprivileged speech variants discussed 
demonstrate how the cultures of a period only just moving to the printed word acted to socially 
disable those who utterances were ‘imperfect’. For some, speech defects could be safely explained 
away as childhood aberrations or emotional outbursts, temporary conditions which bore no 
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significance for their social identity. For others, by implication, speaking differently could be heard as 
an irrevocable stamp of difference, of particularities of geographical location and social hierarchy, and 
of thresholds of mental and intellectual capability that barred entry into social discourse. Although it 
is no longer possible to hear these lost voices, their traces make clear that in the Renaissance, 
speaking differently could effectively become not speaking at all. 
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